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APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF 
BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP IN ṢUKŪK 
STRUCTURES: AN ISLAMIC LEGAL 
ANALYSIS♣
Engku Rabiah Adawiah*, Nermin Klopic**,  
Muhammad Ramadhan Fitri Ellias***   
and Muhamad Nasir Haron****
Abstract 
Asset ownership is an important aspect of ṣukūk structuring and 
issuance. However, a recurring and contentious issue regarding the 
underlying ṣukūk asset is the actual nature of its ownership and the 
corresponding legal implications for ṣukūk holders and other parties 
in the ṣukūk transaction. Many ṣukūk are based solely on beneficial 
ownership of the assets whilst legal title is retained by the originator 
or trustee. This paper attempts to ascertain the status of beneficial 
ownership vis-à-vis registered legal title from the Islamic legal 
perspective. The paper begins with an examination of the meaning, 
origin and status of beneficial ownership under English law. This 
is followed by a brief discussion on ownership (milkiyyah) from the 
Sharīʿah (Islamic law) perspective and a deliberation on the status of 
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beneficial ownership under the Sharīʿah. Finally, the paper analyses 
the use of beneficial ownership in ṣukūk structures and its implication 
on ṣukūk holders and other parties in the ṣukūk transaction.  
Keywords: Beneficial Ownership, Legal Title, Ṣukūk,  Islamic Legal 
Analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
An underlying asset is a prerequisite feature in ṣukūk structures to 
the extent that ṣukūk are often described as—or are, by definition, 
required to be—“asset-based”. This is especially true for ṣukūk al-
ijārah, which was the most preferred ṣukūk structure in the early 
days of global ṣukūk expansion between the years 2001 and 2006. 
However, later (2004 onwards) ṣukūk structures such as ṣukūk al-
mushārakah, ṣukūk al-muḍārabah and ṣukūk al-wakālah may be 
considered more “asset-light” in nature because there may not be a 
revenue-generating asset at the outset of the ṣukūk’s issuance, though 
the asset is intended to be built or acquired later in order to generate 
returns or cash flow to the ṣukūk holders. 
The critical position of the asset can be seen in the various 
definitions of ṣukūk. For example, the Islamic Financial Services 
Board (IFSB) defines ṣukūk as:
Certificates with each sakk representing a proportional 
undivided ownership right in tangible assets, or a pool of 
predominantly tangible assets, or a business venture (such 
as a muḍārabah). These assets may be in a specific project 
or investment activity in accordance with Sharīʿah rules and 
principles (IFSB, 2009: 3). 
The Sharīʿah Standard No. 17 (2) of the Accounting and Auditing 
Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) (2010) in 
turn defines investment ṣukūk as:
 وأ عفانم وأ نايعأ ةيكلم في ةعئاش اصصح لثتم ةميقلا ةيواستم قئاثو يه
 كلذو ،صاخ يرامثتسا طاشن وأ ينعم عورشم تادوجوم في وأ تامدخ
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 اميف  اهمادختسا  ءدبو  باتتكلاا  باب  لفقو  صوكصلا  ةميق  ليصتح  دعب
.هلجأ نم تاردصأ
Investment ṣukūk are certificates of equal value representing 
undivided shares in ownership of tangible assets, usufruct 
and services or of the assets of a particular project or specific 
investment activity; however, this is true after receipt of 
the value of the ṣukūk,  the closing of subscription and the 
employment of funds received for the purpose for which the 
ṣukūk were issued.
Based on the above definitions, it is clear that the asset is a critical 
element in ṣukūk structuring and issuance. In fact, the asset underlies 
the ṣukūk,  and the ṣukūk represents undivided ownership in the asset. 
Yet, a recurring and contentious issue regarding the underlying ṣukūk 
asset is the actual nature of its ownership and the legal implications 
this has for ṣukūk holders and other parties in the ṣukūk transaction. In 
most ṣukūk structures, the transaction in the asset results in a transfer 
of beneficial ownership only whilst the legal title is retained by the 
originator or trustee. As such, the question that is posed is: when the 
ownership is categorised as beneficial only, without legal title, is the 
ṣukūk holders’ ownership of the underlying asset sufficient (such as 
the right to use and dispose of the asset) for the basis of the ṣukūk 
under Islamic law? This paper attempts to examine this issue.  
Section II of the paper compares beneficial ownership with 
ownership of the legal title (commonly termed as legal ownership). 
Section III then examines the meaning, origin and status of beneficial 
ownership under English law in particular. This is followed by a brief 
discussion on ownership (milkiyyah) from the Sharīʿah perspective 
and a deliberation on the status of beneficial ownership under the 
Sharīʿah in Section IV. Section V examines the use of beneficial 
ownership in some ṣukūk structures and its implication on the ṣukūk 
holders and other parties in the ṣukūk transaction. This section also 
determines whether the beneficial ownership structured in the ṣukūk 
examined is sufficient to qualify as ownership from the perspective 
of the Sharīʿah. Section VI summarises and concludes the discussion.
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II. BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP VIS-Ā-VIS  
LEGAL OWNERSHIP
The term “beneficial ownership” has been used interchangeably 
with a number of other terminologies, such as: “beneficial interest”, 
“beneficial title”, “equitable ownership” and “equitable interest”. In 
the business or commercial context, the term “beneficial owner” has 
been defined by Chaiban and Kanh (2004: 116) as follows:
 تاكلتمم وأ راقع وأ ةيلام ةقروب عافتنلاا قبح عتمتي يذلا ةأشنلما وأ صخشلا
 كص وأ لجس في هسما رهظي يذلا كلالما وه نكي لم وأ ناك ءاوس ىرخأ
ةيكللما
The person or institution that enjoys the beneficial right in a 
security, real estate or other assets, whether or not he is the 
owner whose name appears in the register or certificate of 
ownership. 
Likewise, Investopedia (n.d.: para. 1) defines a beneficial owner as a 
person who enjoys the benefits of ownership even though the title is 
in another person’s name.
In the legal context, the term beneficial ownership or its other 
synonyms and related terms has been defined in contemporary legal 
literature either in a general manner or in a more specific context 
of trust arrangements and/or investment in securities. Black’s Law 
Dictionary (n.d.: para. 1) for example defines “beneficial interest” 
generally as “profit, benefit, or advantage resulting from a contract, 
or the ownership of an estate as distinct from the legal ownership 
or control.” The same dictionary further defines a beneficial owner 
in the context of investment in securities as “the actual owner of 
securities and the rightful recipient of the benefits accorded; the 
beneficial owner is often different from the title holder (generally a 
financial institution holding the securities on behalf of clients).”
In another definition by Cornell University (n.d.: para. 1) 
beneficial ownership is said to be “a trust arrangement whereby the 
beneficial owner of a security has the power to vote on and influence 
decisions regarding that security, and receives the benefit afforded 
by the security, even though in street name the security may be held 
by someone other than the true owner, such as a broker, for safety or 
convenience reasons.” 
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It follows that a beneficial owner is “someone recognized in equity 
as the owner of property even though legal title may belong to 
someone else. The use and enjoyment of the property belong to the 
beneficial owner. In securities law, the term refers to someone who 
is a shareholder even though a broker may hold legal title to the 
shares.” (Cornell University, n.d.: para. 1)
Based on the definitions above, it is clear that in law, a beneficial 
owner is regarded effectively as the real or actual owner who is 
entitled to enjoy the benefits of the asset, although he/she does not 
have the legal title to the asset. 
In addition to beneficial ownership is the ownership of the legal 
title (legal ownership). Some assets, including property, air/sea/
land vehicles, bank accounts and financial securities, are generally 
required to have a legal title owner. In general, the legal title owner is 
someone legally recognised as the title owner of the asset evidenced 
by registration or record. The term legal title owner is sometimes used 
to describe a person who holds legal title to a property for someone 
else's benefit. This is true when the beneficial interest in the property 
belongs to person other than the legal title owner. Examples of legal 
title owners are trustees and record owners.1 Table 1 summarises the 
differences between beneficial ownership and ownership of the legal 
title.
Table 1: Beneficial Ownership vs. Ownership of Legal Title
No. Beneficial Ownership Ownership of Legal Title
1. Beneficial owner is the person who 
enjoys the benefits of ownership 
even though the title is in another 
person’s name.
The legal title owner is someone 
who is legally registered as the title 
owner of the asset whose ownership 
is evidenced by registration or 
record.
2. Interchangeably used with 
other terminologies, such as: 
“beneficial interest”, “beneficial 
title”, “equitable ownership” and 
“equitable interest”.
It can also be referred to as registered 
or record owner.
3. Beneficial owner enjoys the benefits 
from the asset.
Poorest can be included by integrating 
zakāh with microfinancing
1 A record owner is “a property owner whose name appears on the title. The term 
commonly refers to brokers who hold legal title to shares but pass the voting rights, 
profits, and losses on to the beneficial owners.” (Cornell University, n.d.: para. 1)
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III. ORIGIN AND STATUS OF BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP 
FROM LEGAL PERSPECTIVE
The concept of beneficial ownership was developed in modern times 
in English common law. In fact, the segregation between legal title 
and beneficial title under English law is said to go back to as early as 
the seventh and eighth centuries in England (Watt, 2003: 8-9). The 
segregation was evident in a system known as the “use”. The “use” 
would arise when legal ownership was transferred to one party for the 
use of another (Hepburn, 1997: 217). For example, if A had received 
an asset for the benefit (use) of B, under common law, A was obliged 
to hold the asset on B’s behalf. The system was limited to chattels and 
money until in the thirteenth century when the Chancellor recognised 
the execution of “uses” in land (Watt, 2003: 8). 
According to Watt (2003: 8-9) the “use” was brought to an end 
with the Statute of Uses that was enacted by Henry VIII in the fifteenth 
century. Pettit (2012: 12) observes that the Statute was largely 
passed because the King was losing feudal dues through practice 
of the “uses”. However, the Statute of Uses was circumvented by 
execution of “the use upon a use” and it was finally repealed in 1925 
(Thompson, 1995: 19). 
Later, the application of beneficial ownership in England was 
extended further through the development of the law of trust. Hepburn 
(1997: 217) notes that trust is one of the most important creations of 
the Law of Equity2 and that the modern form of trust evolved from 
the early device of “use” that we have discussed earlier. 
The use of the concept of beneficial ownership is also extended 
into the application of proprietary rights in commercial transactions. 
For example, Worthington’s (1996) study shows that it is possible 
2 English law developed two different jurisprudential streams: common law and 
equity. English common law was characterized with rigidity due to the “inflexible 
procedures surrounding the common law writs.” Some frustrated litigants started to 
petition the King seeking for justice. To deal with these petitions, the Chancellor was 
authorized to issue royal writs in the fourteenth century. Initially, the Chancellor’s 
decisions were unpredictable because they are often based on an appeal to matters 
of conscience. However, over time, the Court of Chancery started to adopt a more 
objective approach, whereby rules and principles began to be developed. This 
development represents the root for the foundation of English law of equity (Evans, 
2009: 4; and Thompson, 1995: 16).
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for a seller of goods to retain legal ownership, although the buyer 
will get all the rights granted by the agreement. These rights include 
authority that entitles him/her to use and sell the goods. The author 
argues that the concept of “legal ownership is sufficiently flexible 
to allow both buyer and seller to agree on right which meets their 
commercial objectives” (Worthington, 1996: 16-20). This flexibility 
is considered to be a device which safeguards the seller’s interest. 
Honore’s work provides a list of standard ingredients in the 
notion of ownership in terms of its most general concept, which is full 
ownership. The study reveals that ownership comprises the following 
rights: “(i) the right to possess; (ii) the right to use; (iii) the right 
to manage; (iv) the right to the income of the thing; (v) the right to 
the capital; (vi) the right to security; (vii) the right or incidents of 
transmissibility and absence of term; (viii) the prohibition of harmful 
use; (ix) the liability to execution; and, (x) the incident of residuarity” 
(Honore, 1992: 130-131). The author then elaborated on each right 
and incident from this list. 
Based on the explanations above, it is evident that the 
concept of ownership in English law has passed through several 
evolutionary stages throughout history. It is also clear that English 
law distinguishes between the two types of ownership, i.e., legal 
title and beneficial ownership rights. In fact, beneficial ownership 
is legally considered a real ownership right as it carries features of 
both personal and proprietary rights, where the beneficial owner 
has a direct interest in the asset which is the subject matter of the 
ownership. The establishment of trusts law was certainly one of the 
important milestones in the evolution of the ownership concept in 
English law. The invention of trust was a direct outcome of equity 
to prevent the perceived injustice and rigidity that occurred under 
common law. Trusts provide a flexible device to govern the transfer 
of ownership rights from one to the other. Trust arrangements address 
people’s needs in transferring ownership rights among themselves, 
using the segregation between legal title and beneficial ownership, 
according to the intention of the contracting parties. Thus, trusts aptly 
illustrate the dichotomy between legal title and beneficial ownership, 
such that beneficial ownership can be said to be one of the most 
significant outcomes of trust law. 
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It should be noted that the doctrine of ownership in English law 
differs substantially from jurisdictions that derive their laws from the 
Roman law. Civil law accepts the concept of absolute ownership over 
both chattels and land. By contrast, English law recognises absolute 
ownership in chattels only, while the only absolute owner of land 
is the King. The owner of a piece of land is not considered to be 
the holder of absolute ownership but the holder of an “estate”, a 
word closely related to the status of a tenant (Butt, 1988: 64-65). In 
this respect, Tyler & Palmer (1973: 40) cited: “Land cannot be the 
subject-matter of ownership, though the person in whom its ‘seisin’ 
is vested is entitled to exercise proprietary rights in respect of it.” In 
other words, one cannot own land but only the title to an estate in 
land. According to Todd and Wilson (2003: 4), “an estate in land can 
be regarded as a right to possess land for a period of time.” 
Based on the General Report of the European University Institute 
(EUI) (2005), in the civil law jurisdiction, there is only one type 
of ownership which comprehends all ownership rights. Civil law 
allows joint ownership, yet the ownership cannot be split between 
two different entities in terms of ownership rights. The existence and 
use of trust is another significant distinction between civil law and 
common law (Shmid et al., 2005: 12). The concept of a trust, which is 
recognized in English law, is not part of the civil law system in most 
continental European countries (Van Mens, 1992: 45)
Buckland (2002: 15) wrote, “So too, we shall not find the trust, as 
a general institution, in Roman law: of this conception it is common 
knowledge that the Roman law and the systems derived from it possess 
no parallel.” However, there are a number of jurisdictions not based 
on the English legal model which have introduced legislation related 
to the taxation of trusts. Also, there are instances in some civil law 
jurisdictions where certain devices give outcome similar to the 
outcome of trust law. 
Sonneveldt’s (1992: 1-17) research shows that the common 
perception is that there are several factors in civil law that represent 
the main obstacles for introducing the trust into civil law jurisdiction. 
Those factors are: (i) inconsistency with duplication of ownership 
rights; (ii) public registration of rights in rem involves tax codification 
of such rights; (iii) existence of adequate devices serving the same 
purpose to a certain degree.
Engku Rabiah Adawiah, Nermin Klopic, Muhammad Ramadhan Fitri Ellias 
and Muhamad Nasir Haron
113ISRA International Journal of Islamic Finance • Vol. 7 • Issue 2 • 2015
According to Van Mens (1992: 45-49), Switzerland for instance, has 
established a detailed trusts law, which originates from 1926. Van 
Mens’ (1992) work shows that Switzerland’s encouraging attitude 
towards foreign wealth contributed to a positive attitude towards 
trusts. Furthermore, the study reveals that for tax purposes Swiss law 
considers the trustee to be a nominee owner. “This nominee is not 
subject to Swiss income tax, nor to Swiss net wealth tax, leaving the 
tax burden to the beneficiary or settlor.”
In addition, Rehahn and Grimm’s (2012: 97-105) work shows 
that though Germany does not recognize the concept of trust under 
English law, there are various branches in German law that provide 
outcomes similar to the trust law, i.e. the fiduciary relationship. 
One example is the law of succession that spells out the concept of 
Vorerbe and Nacherbe. Although Vorerbe is the legal owner, its legal 
powers are restricted to the benefit of Nacherbe. Another example is 
the Testamentvollstrecker, who holds strong legal powers though the 
legal title is held by somebody else. Furthermore, there are instances 
in German law where a departure from indivisibility of property 
ownership is clearly demonstrated in the refinancing register, which 
gives “certain creditors the power to act like a legal owner in order to 
protect the refinancing company”.
Based on the foregoing discussion, it may be concluded that 
the civil law tradition does not formally, in principle, recognise 
the dichotomy between beneficial ownership and legal ownership; 
it recognises only one absolute indivisible ownership. There may, 
however, exist some practices in a few civil law jurisdictions that 
give an outcome similar to that of a trust. In contrast, the concepts 
of beneficial ownership and legal title are clearly recognised by 
Common law. 
IV. OWNERSHIP (MILKIYYAH) AND BENEFICIAL 
OWNERSHIP FROM THE SHARĪʿAH PERSPECTIVE
The crucial issue is: what is the Sharīʿah perspective on ownership, 
and how does this reconcile with beneficial ownership and legal 
title? More specifically, is the practice of using beneficial ownership 
in many of the transactions in Islamic finance, ṣukūk in particular, 
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acceptable in the Sharīʿah? In an attempt to answer these questions, 
this section will first discuss the concept of ownership in Islamic 
law. This is followed by an examination of the status of legal and 
beneficial ownership under the Sharīʿah.   
a. The Concept of Ownership in Islamic Law
From the Sharīʿah perspective, ownership (milk/milkiyyah) can be 
defined as:
 ازجاحو ،هيف هفرصتل اقلطم نوكي ،ءيش ينبو صخشلا ينب يعرش لاصتا
هيف هيرغ فرصت نع
A legal connection (ittiṣāl sharʿī) between a person and an 
asset, such that he is free to transact with it and exclude 
others from dealing with it (the asset) (Ḥammād, 2008: 441).
Al-ʿAbbādī (1974: 271) notes that the expression “absolute 
taṣarruf”, as mentioned by the jurists, refers to any type of dealing, 
regardless of whether it is physical dealing in something with the 
purpose to extract personal benefits from the asset or to benefit from 
its revenue, or legal dealings with the aim to transfer its ownership. 
In Muhammad Baltāji’s view, milkiyyah refers to “what the law 
has established regarding a person’s exclusive right concerning a 
thing in terms of using it, exploiting it, and dealing with it within 
the limits of the law” (Baltāji, 2007: 59). Baltāji clearly specifies the 
different types of dealings, i.e. the right to use, exploit and deal with 
the asset, whereas Al-ʿAbbādī (1974) mentions dealings in general to 
be sufficient to constitute taṣarruf. 
The definitions provided by the jurists imply that milkiyyah 
governs the relationship between a person and a property. It is a 
bundle of exclusive rights which entitles the owner to benefit from a 
property, to be compensated in case of transgression and to dispose of 
it, except in cases where legal hindrance exists. Ownership dealings 
are subject to the provisions of the law and the legal capacity of the 
owner. 
These constituents can be divided into five groups concerning 
the various aspects of milkiyyah that the definitions address, namely, 
(i) authority, (ii) scope, (iii) subject matter, (iv) restrictions, and 
Engku Rabiah Adawiah, Nermin Klopic, Muhammad Ramadhan Fitri Ellias 
and Muhamad Nasir Haron
115ISRA International Journal of Islamic Finance • Vol. 7 • Issue 2 • 2015
(v) consequences of ownership. Table 2 depicts the five aspects 
mentioned in the definitions of milkiyyah by the jurists.
Table 2: Aspects of Ownership According to the Jurists
No. Aspects of Ownership Explanation
1 Authority Establishment of authority based on the law. This 
implies that ownership enjoys legal authority accorded 
to it by the law. 
2 Scope Scope of ownership covers the relationship between 
a person and property. Person in this case refers to 
human beings and legal entities such as the entity of 
an endowment, investment or, in contemporary times, 
a company. Ownership does not entail a relationship 
between a property and a delegated person.  
3 Subject Matter The subject matter of ownership is property. This 
includes ownership of physical assets and of rights. 
4 Restrictions A number of legal restrictions may be imposed by the 
law on one’s ownership with the aim to preserve the 
property and ownership rights. Examples of restrictions 
are limitations imposed on dealings of children and 
bankrupt persons. 
5 Consequences Ownership results in a number of consequences, such 
as rights to deal with, dispose of, consume, extract 
benefits and be compensated, in relation to the subject 
matter. These consequences are subject to the law. 
Therefore any illegitimate dealing or consumption is 
not a consequence of milkiyyah. 
Concerning the last item in Table 2, i.e. the consequences of milkiyyah, 
the fundamental evidence in the Sharīʿah sources that addresses this 
issue can be found in the statement of the Prophet (SAW): “The 
mortgaged item remains the property of the owner who mortgaged 
it. He (the mortgagor) is entitled to its benefits, and he is liable for 
its expenses (or loss)” (Ibn Hajar, 2003: 317). The highlighted words 
imply that the two consequences of ownership are: (i) the entitlement 
to benefit from the asset; and (ii) the liability for the asset.
The hadīth (prophetic tradition) confirms that milkiyyah provides 
the owner with the entitlement to benefit from the subject matter of 
ownership, which is consistent with the definitions above. It also adds 
another dimension to the ownership, which is the owner’s liability 
over the subject matter. This includes maintenance of the subject 
matter in a proper state and its preservation against decay, including 
all necessary outlays such as feeding, clothing, safekeeping, and 
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others (AAOIFI Sharīʿah Standards, 2010: 709). The owner of an 
asset also bears liability for any damages caused or triggered by such 
asset.  
A clarification regarding the relationship between the entitlement 
to the benefits and the liability for the asset has been provided in 
another hadīth, where it is reported that the Prophet (SAW) said, 
“Al-kharāj bi al-ḍamān”, which literally means “[The right to] gain 
comes with liability.” The hadīth is deemed authentic by the classical 
scholars of the prophetic tradition (Ibn Hajar, 2003: 301). It also 
represents one of the well-established maxims in Islamic commercial 
law. 
Baghawī (1983: 8/164) remarks that the above tradition means 
that if a person buys a house or animal and receives revenue from 
renting it or leasing it, and subsequently discovers a defect in the 
house or the animal, he is entitled to return it to the seller and be given 
a refund, while retaining the revenue (if any) that was generated from 
the house or the animal by virtue of being liable for the house/animal 
during the period. Therefore, ownership of the revenue arising from a 
property belongs to the person who is liable for it. 
Having elaborated on the meaning of the liability of a person for 
an asset that he owns, we will now turn our attention to the analysis 
of the right to deal with an asset. The scholars agree that the right 
to deal with the subject of ownership is one of the ownership rights 
originally derived from the law. However, the scholars have further 
discussion as to whether or not this right is an essential component 
of milkiyyah. 
In this context, Ibn Hummām (1995: 230) and Ibn Nujaym 
(1998: 382) define ownership as a legal (sharʿī) right that is vested 
in an individual to deal with an asset. This definition implies that the 
right to deal with and dispose of an asset is an essential component 
of the concept of ownership. In contrast, Al-Qarāfī (2010: 1009-
1010) opines that the right to deal with or dispose of the asset does 
not represent a fundamental constituent of ownership. He argues 
that, from the perspective of legal rights, ownership over an asset 
differs from the right to deal with it. For instance, an interdicted 
individual does not have the right to dispose of assets which he owns. 
Furthermore, a purchase or sale may be executed by somebody who 
does not own the subject matter, such as, an agent or by way of a 
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court order. Holding possession also does not necessarily entitle the 
holder to dispose of or otherwise manage what he holds, for example, 
in the case of a custodian.
In relation to the issue of right to asset disposal and management 
by the owner, Ibn Nujaym (1998: 382) observes that this refers to 
specific eligibility originally granted by the Lawgiver (Allah SWT). 
In contrast, an agent does not derive his right to asset disposal and 
management originally from the Lawgiver, but merely through a valid 
authorization by the owner. Therefore, any disposal done without the 
consent of the original owner is deemed invalid. In relation to an 
interdicted individual, Ibn Nujaym (1998: 382) limits the restriction 
on the owner’s right to disposal and management to certain “legal 
obstacles”, one of which is unsound financial behaviour that triggers 
the imposition of interdiction by relevant authorities. 
Based on the above arguments of Ibn Nujaym (1998: 382), it can 
be said that enjoyment of wealth is the main objective of ownership 
while the right to asset disposal and its management is one of the 
manifestations of wealth enjoyment. In other words, the benefit of 
the utility of an asset is fundamental to ownership, but its enjoyment 
is reasonably associated with the right to asset disposal and 
management, without which, the enjoyment would not be complete 
or would entirely be missed. Nonetheless, as pointed out by Al-Qarāfī 
(2010: 1009-1010), Islamic law sometimes imposes some restrictions 
on the owner’s right to asset disposal and management, in which case 
the owner may be unable to exercise full ownership rights. This is 
to address special situations such as in the case of an interdicted 
individual, a minor or an incapacitated person. In addition, Islamic 
law imposes specific regulations to protect the wealth of people, 
such as, in the case of individuals who fail to fulfill their financial 
obligations or debts towards others. For this purpose, the Sharīʿah 
permits certain parties such as the courts to exercise their judicial 
powers, in specific situations and subject to certain legal maxims 
and parameters, to dispose of assets owned by someone else. In all 
these situations, the restrictions do not totally deny the existence of 
ownership. In fact, ownership can still exist despite the restriction, 
but its enjoyment is temporarily and/or circumstantially incomplete. 
Perhaps in recognition of this dichotomy between the general 
definition of ownership and possible restrictions on its actual 
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enjoyment in specific circumstances, scholars tend to classify 
ownership into two categories: complete ownership (milk tamm) and 
incomplete ownership (milk nāqiṣ). For instance, Al-ʿAbbādī (1974: 
274), Abū Zahrah (1996: 67-68), and Nazīh Ḥammād (2008: 441) 
classify ownership in Islamic law, from the perspective of the extent of 
ownership rights, into complete and incomplete. Complete ownership 
is “the ownership that covers both the corpus of the property as well 
as its usufructs” (Abū Zahrah, 1996: 67). Alternatively, according to 
Al-Naysāburī (1982: 261), complete ownership can also be defined 
as, “full control over an asset in terms of any kind of (legal) dealings 
or disposals”. This type of ownership gives the owner all possible 
legal rights associated with the owned property, and it is unconditional 
and has no time limit as long as the property continues to exist (Abū 
Zahrah, 1996: 67; Ḥammād, 2008: 441). 
On the other hand, incomplete ownership can be defined as the 
ownership of either the property but not of its usufruct, or vice versa 
(Abū Zahrah, 1996: 68). Thus, the main reason behind the creation 
of incomplete ownership lies in the separation of ownership rights in 
two different things—the corpus of the asset and the usufruct of the 
asset (Madkūr, 1996: 498). Alternatively, incomplete ownership can 
also be defined as one in which the owner does not have a complete 
right to transact (Ḥammād, 2008: 443). The incomplete ownership 
of a property may result from any one of these three scenarios: (i) a 
person only owns the corpus of an asset but not its usufruct (e.g. a 
legal heir’s right to the corpus of the inherited estate in the existence 
of a bequest (wasiyyah) of its usufruct to another for a specified 
period of time); (ii) a person owns the usufruct but not the asset 
itself (e.g. a lessee’s ownership of the usufruct in a lease contract); 
or, (iii) a person who owns both the corpus and usufruct of an asset 
but is interdicted from transacting with the asset (e.g. a debtor who is 
under interdiction to protect the creditor’s rights to recover the debt) 
(Ḥammād, 2008: 443). 
Badrān (1986: 310) is of the view that incomplete ownership may 
occur in one of three scenarios: first, raqabah3 without usufructs; 
or second, usufructs without raqabah and without right of disposal 
3 Raqabah refers to the tangible part of an asset. Although raqabah generates 
usufructs, the usufructs may be owned by an entity other than the owner of the 
raqabah.   
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(ḥaqq al-intifāʿ al-shakhṣī);4 or third, usufructs without raqabah 
and with right of disposal (ḥaqq al-intifāʿ al-ʿaynī). The difference 
between the last two scenarios is that, in the former, the right of the 
usufruct owner over the asset is limited to personal use by the usufruct 
owner. Hence, it is impermissible for him to dispose of the underlying 
asset or its usufruct. In contrast, the right of the usufruct owner over 
the asset in the latter (i.e. ḥaqq al-intifāʿ al-ʿaynī) is attached to the 
corpus of the asset of the usufruct and this permits the usufruct owner 
to deal or transact in the usufruct (Al-Zarqā, 1998: 373).    
In conclusion, the definitions and explanations about incomplete 
ownership above imply that the holder of incomplete or partial 
ownership has only partial control over the asset in terms of enjoyment, 
dealings and disposals. The discussion on incomplete ownership also 
indicates the existence of a dichotomy between ownership of the 
corpus of the asset and ownership of its usufructs; as well as between 
the ownership of the asset and full enjoyment of the ownership rights 
due to some restrictions imposed by law or contract.
Islamic law thus allows for a segregation of ownership in certain 
circumstances as a means to meet the needs of people. In this regard, 
we can see at least two instances from classical fiqh where one asset 
may be owned by two different owners, each with a specific set of 
ownership rights. The first instance is the recognition of duality in 
ownership in the discussion of the jurists on complete and incomplete 
ownership that we have alluded to in some details above. The second 
instance is in the concept and application of waqf.     
Waqf clearly illustrates that an ownership right can be split. 
Although the jurists have differences of view on the issue of whether 
the settlor (wāqif) in waqf loses his ownership of the waqf assets or 
not, their views imply that the rights of ownership over the waqf asset 
are split between two different entities. On the one hand, raqabah is 
owned by God (as per the view of Ḥanbalī and Shāfiʿīʾ scholars), or 
by the settlor (according to Ḥanafī and Mālikī Schools). On the other 
hand, the right to enjoyment (ḥaqq al-intifāʿ) belongs to the waqf 
beneficiaries (Kahf, 2000: 119).      
4 This is applicable in the contract of iʿārah. Iʿārah grants the usufructs of household 
goods, equipment, animals, etc., for personal use of the taker without any 
consideration. The relationship will be turned into a leasing (ijārah) contract if the 
taker is obliged to pay for the usufruct
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b. Status of Legal and Beneficial Ownership  
under the Sharīʿah
 
In contemporary times, the issue of separation between legal title 
and beneficial ownership has been further examined either directly or 
indirectly by a number of Sharīʿah scholars or bodies. One example of 
an indirect observation of the issue is a verdict (fatwa) issued by the 
Sharīʿah Committee of Rajhi Bank in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
(KSA). The verdict addresses a case where a property is purchased 
from a person (the first seller). The property is subsequently sold 
to a third party while the legal title is kept with the first seller for 
tax benefits. The first transaction will be documented in the name 
of Rajhi Bank and will be certified by the relevant authorities in 
the United States. Upon deliberation, the Committee approved the 
transaction subject to the following conditions: (i) such dealing is 
not regarded as fraud in the country; (ii) the method is deemed a 
legal solution (makhraj) that gives benefits to the parties involved 
(Sharīʿah Committee of Rajhi Bank, 2010: 68). 
Another example of indirect elaboration on beneficial ownership 
is found in the AAOIFI Sharīʿah Standards on financing facilities 
based on the concept of murābaḥah for a purchaser’s order. 
According to the Standard (8/5/4), it is permissible for the bank to 
defer registration of the title in the client’s name as a security for 
payment of the deferred price. The bank must however provide a 
document that establishes the ownership of the client over the goods. 
In the reasoning for this Standard, it was stated that this arrangement 
does not preclude the transfer of ownership (milkiyyah) to the client 
(AAOIFI, 2010: 97 & 107).     
In both verdicts, jurists have approved that the title be held by 
a person/entity who is not the ultimate or actual purchaser. In both 
cases, documentary evidence recognised by the relevant legal system 
was required, and the evidence must prove the ownership interest of 
the actual owner in the property. These two examples indicate that 
the Sharīʿah Committee of Rajhi Bank and the Sharīʿah Board of 
AAOIFI have recognised separation between legal title and actual 
ownership. This implies that the segregation between legal title and 
beneficial ownership is acceptable and permissible according to this 
Islamic legal opinion. 
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In addition, the topic of beneficial ownership has been specifically 
discussed by a number of Sharīʿah scholars and bodies such as the 
Sharīʿah Advisory Council of Bank Negara Malaysia, AAOIFI’s 
Sharīʿah Board, Ḥussain Ḥāmid Ḥassān and Bashir al-Amine. 
The Sharīʿah Advisory Council of Bank Negara Malaysia (SAC 
of BNM, 2010: 6) and AAOIFI’s Sharīʿah Board (AAOIFI, 2010: 
Addendum One) have implied in their resolutions that both legal and 
beneficial ownership are recognised from the Sharīʿah perspective. 
More specifically, the SAC of BNM discussed beneficial ownership 
in the context of ijārah since in current practice the lessor does not 
hold the legal title of the ijārah assets. The SAC, in its 29th meeting 
dated 25 September 2002, resolved that the lessor is the owner of the 
leased asset although his name is not registered in the asset’s title 
(SAC of BNM, 2010: 6). The resolution was based on the Sharīʿah 
recognition of both legal title and beneficial ownership. The SAC 
recognised that in products based on ijārah the lessor has the beneficial 
ownership although the asset is not registered under his name. Such 
beneficial ownership may be proved through the documentation of 
the ijārah agreement concluded between the lessor and the lessee and 
presumably the purchase agreement between the seller and lessor/
purchaser (SAC of BNM, 2010: 6).
In contrast, Ḥussain Ḥāmid Ḥassān (n.d.) deemed beneficial 
ownership to be impermissible because an owner must have complete 
ownership of an asset in order to have the right of disposal and to 
justify his/her earnings from it. Similarly, Al-Amine (2011: 119-
120) is of the view that beneficial ownership violates the concept 
of ownership in Islamic law because “ownership in Islamic law is 
beneficial as well as legal and there is no way of separating the two.” 
The summary of the jurists’ views on this issue is presented in Table 
3.
Table 3: Jurists’ Views on Beneficial Ownership
Topic Status Authority
1 Legitimacy of registration 
of title of one’s asset in the 
name of a person/entity 
who does not actually 
own it
Permissible 1. Sharīʿah Committee of 
Rajhi Bank, Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia 
2. AAOIFI Sharīʿah 
Standards 2010
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2 Legitimacy of applying 
beneficial ownership in 




Sharīʿah Advisory Council of 
Bank Negara Malaysia
1. Ḥussain Ḥāmid Ḥassān
2. Bashir Al-Amine
It should be noted that the resolutions that recognise beneficial 
ownership come with a clear condition that the beneficial ownership 
must result in all rights and liabilities attached to the purchased asset 
being attributed to the buyers, albeit short of legal title. In addition, 
the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), in elucidating the 
parameter of ownership in one of its standards, states that the structure 
must transfer all ownership rights in the assets from the originator via 
the issuer to the investors. Depending on the applicable legal system, 
these ownership rights do not necessarily include registered title. 
The transfer could be a simple collection of ownership attributes that 
allow the investor (a) to step into the shoes of the originator and (b) 
to perform (perhaps via a servicer) duties related to ownership and 
(c) ownership liabilities (e.g. duty of care). The transfer could also 
include rights granting access to the assets, subject to notice, and in 
case of default, the right to take possession of the assets (IFSB, 2009: 
9).
In practice, the condition set by various Sharīʿah bodies which 
allow the use of beneficial ownership as elaborated above has been 
achieved legally through the application of the English law of trust. 
When a person holds an asset in trust for another, the beneficiary can 
be construed to be the beneficial owner of the asset held by the trustee. 
The relationship between the trustee and the beneficiary is evidenced 
by a trust deed executed by the settlor. Alternatively, the trust deed 
can also be documented to allow the relationship between the trustee 
and the beneficiaries to be created through the issuance of a trust 
instrument by the trustee to the beneficiary or class of beneficiaries 
(Haneef, n.d.: 5). For instance, a settlor can create a trust over, say, 
a house pursuant to a trust deed and appoint a trustee to issue trust 
instruments to a class of beneficiaries. The class of beneficiaries will 
be limited to the investors who purchase the trust instruments offered 
by the trustee for a certain consideration. The investors who purchase 
the trust instruments will automatically become the beneficiaries of 
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the trust and be construed as pro-rata owners of the house held on 
trust by the trustee. The trust deed can also be structured to allow 
the holders of the trust instrument to transfer the trust instruments to 
others on a willing-buyer and willing-seller basis. If the trustee leases 
the house to a tenant for a fixed or variable rental term, the holders 
of the trust instrument will be entitled to a pro-rata share of the rental 
income derived from the house held on trust (Pettit, 1997: 14-17).
These characteristics of the trust instrument and its subsequent 
legal effects squarely meet the requirements of milkiyyah from the 
Sharīʿah perspective, either as complete ownership (milk tāmm) or at 
least incomplete ownership (milk nāqiṣ), depending on the extent of 
liberty and control enjoyed by the beneficial owner/s as prescribed by 
the trust deed.
V. APPLICATION OF BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP IN  
ṢUKŪK AND ITS SHARĪʿAH STATUS 
 
In the context of ṣukūk,  many of the transactions underlying the 
issuance involve the sale of assets by an originator to a Special Purpose 
Vehicle (SPV) or Trustee, but the originator only transfers beneficial 
interests of the asset to the latter, and not the legal title, in order to 
avoid contravening certain legal restrictions or for convenience or 
cost efficiency purposes. This gives rise to a Sharīʿah concern on 
whether the sale of an asset resulting in a transfer of beneficial interests 
without the legal title is recognised under the Sharīʿah or not. Based 
on the discussion about beneficial ownership under English law as 
well as the Sharīʿah resolutions by the AAOIFI Sharīʿah Standard 
and the SAC of BNM, it is clear that the sale of assets where only the 
beneficial ownership is transferred is recognised under the Sharīʿah.  
Thus, when an SPV which has acquired beneficial ownership over 
the asset later issues the ṣukūk,  the ṣukūk certificates represent real 
ownership of the asset, albeit being described as beneficial interest. 
The holders of the ṣukūk will be construed under the Sharīʿah as 
owners of the asset, although it is being held on trust by the seller who 
acts as a bare trustee. Based on this arrangement, it can be argued 
that the ṣukūk holders have complete ownership (milk tāmm) over the 
asset though they are not the registered owners as far as the legal title 
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is concerned, provided that no substantial restrictions are imposed 
on the liberty of the ṣukūk holders to deal with the asset. If the ṣukūk 
documents contain substantial restrictions on the liberty of the ṣukūk 
holders to deal with the asset, the ṣukūk holders still have ownership 
over the asset, albeit incomplete (milk nāqiṣ).5   
Through this fresh interpretation, the contemporary Sharīʿah 
scholars are able to extend the scope of ownership in Sharīʿah to 
include the concept of beneficial ownership when, as illustrated in 
some of the ṣukūk structures from Malaysia, the true owner in the 
eyes of the law is the beneficial owner and the seller remains only as 
a bare trustee. This, however, might not be a generic conclusion as 
legal frameworks vary from one country to another.
Ṣukūk have often been categorised into two main categories: 
asset-based and asset-backed ṣukūk. This classification has practical 
and legal implications on the parties to the ṣukūk transactions. The 
following sub-sections attempt to examine the concept of beneficial 
ownership and its status in the context of asset-based ṣukūk and asset-
backed ṣukūk,  and the issue of recourse to the ṣukūk assets. 
a. Asset-Based Ṣukūk
There is no technical or widely accepted academic definition for 
“asset-based” ṣukūk. The phrase is loosely coined to describe the 
majority of ṣukūk structures that have been issued in the market. 
Generally, the use of the terms asset-based connotes those ṣukūk 
structures where the asset plays a limited but important role in the 
creation of a legal relationship, including rights and obligations 
between the parties. The existence of the asset also confirms the 
notion that ṣukūk,  like Islamic finance in general, should be linked 
to the real economy via transactions on assets. In comparing asset-
based ṣukūk with asset-backed ṣukūk,  Hidayat (2013: 26) points out 
that the underlying asset used to structure the issuance of asset-based 
ṣukūk remains on the balance sheet of the originator after the issuance 
of the ṣukūk; only partial beneficial ownership passes to the ṣukūk 
5 Further discussion will be made in subsequent sub-topics on the restrictions put on 
the ṣukūk holders in dealing with the underlying ṣukūk asset and their effects on the 
nature of ṣukūk holders’ ownership of and recourse to the asset.
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holders while the originator keeps the full legal title and ownership. 
In other words, from the legal perspective, there is no “true sale” or 
securitisation transaction in an asset-based ṣukūk structure since the 
underlying asset is not sufficiently legally isolated from the originator. 
As a consequence, the ṣukūk holders have very restricted ownership; 
they cannot, for example, sell the asset to a third party and only have 
recourse to the originator/obligor (Hidayat, 2013: 26).  
In an asset-based ṣukūk such as ṣukūk al-ijārah there is normally 
a sale and lease-back arrangement between the owner of an asset 
(known as the originator) and a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), which 
is normally the issuer that will later act on behalf of the investors. 
In this arrangement, the originator typically transfers only partial 
beneficial ownership or equitable interest in the assets to the SPV. The 
legal title is almost always retained by the originator.6 The originator 
either executes an explicit bare trust,7 or at least is deemed to be a bare 
trustee, to declare that the legal title of the asset is held in trust for 
the benefit of the SPV or ultimately the ṣukūk holders.8  Also, in this 
type of ṣukūk,  the originator or the issuer will normally undertake to 
purchase the asset back from the ṣukūk holders upon the occurrence 
of an event of default or maturity of the ṣukūk. Furthermore, typically, 
the ṣukūk holders’ options are limited in the case of a default such 
that their trustee is required to sell the assets to the obligor/lessee and 
the ṣukūk holders thus become unsecured creditors for the sale price, 
with no security over the asset they have sold. 
This practice has been subject to scrutiny, in particular, on 
whether or not there has been a real and valid sale between the 
originator and the SPV. Admittedly, the absence of legal title and the 
existence of a purchase undertaking and requirement to sell may give 
the impression that there is no real sale of the asset by the originator 
to the SPV issuer. However, in the light of the previous discussions 
on the status of beneficial ownership under the English law and the 
Sharīʿah opinions on the issue, it can be argued that this impression 
is not completely accurate. There is a real sale between the originator 
6 This is based on the observation by the authors of many ṣukūk al-ijārah documents.
7 As in the case of the first sovereign ṣukūk al-ijārah by the Malaysian government; 
this information is based on verbal explanation made by some related parties 
involved in the transaction.
8 Offering Memorandum of 1Malaysia Sukuk Global Berhad, p. 61.
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and the SPV, although only part of the beneficial ownership is 
transferred to the buyer, and the seller retains the legal title and a 
part of the ownership rights [the right to dispose of the asset to third-
parties and purchase in case of default]. As we have seen earlier, the 
legal title is retained by the seller-originator in trust for the benefit of 
the buyer, i.e., the beneficial owner. Hence, the buyer can be said to 
be the real partial owner of the asset. The existence of the purchase 
undertaking is also not an issue in ṣukūk al-ijārah because in our 
view, this is an independent and unilateral undertaking (waʿd), which 
is not contractually related to the initial sale contract between the 
originator and the SPV. The lessee-originator, based on his free will, 
can separately make a unilateral undertaking (waʿd) to buy the leased 
asset from the lessor-owner due to the occurrence of specified events 
or at a certain date in the future, similar to any arrangement of ijārah 
muntahiyah bi al-tamlīk. Nonetheless, it is acknowledged that, in 
practical terms, it is very unlikely that the sale from the originator 
would have occurred if a waʿd to repurchase the asset was missing.
However, as noted, although the ṣukūk holders in asset-based 
ṣukūk can be said to have ownership rights over the underlying 
asset represented by the ṣukūk that they hold, the enjoyment of the 
ownership depends very much on the actual terms and conditions 
of the issuance. For example, this type of ṣukūk usually restricts the 
right of the ṣukūk holders to cause the sale or other disposition of 
the ṣukūk asset to a third party upon default of the obligor. Typically, 
they can cause the trustee to call a meeting of the ṣukūk holders and 
exercise their rights under the transaction documents, which may 
include the issuance of notice to the originator/obligor pursuant to 
its undertaking to purchase the assets upon maturity or default of the 
ṣukūk. Here, we can see that the enjoyment of the ownership right 
by the ṣukūk holders is restricted by specific terms on the right to 
disposal of the asset that have been agreed upon by both parties. 
As a result, some legal opinions suggest that the holders of asset-
based ṣukūk will have no real recourse to the assets, but rather, their 
main recourse is actually to the obligor-originator (Elmaki and Ryan, 
2010). This leads to the crux of the debate among Sharīʿah scholars 
who question the use of beneficial ownership in ṣukūk structures. The 
main contention stems from the fact that in some structures (i.e. asset-
based ṣukūk), the ṣukūk holders do not have an outright right to dispose 
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of the asset, especially upon the occurrence of the event of default. 
This seems to be against the basic principle that the ṣukūk holders, as 
full owners of the ṣukūk asset, should be able to deal with it freely. 
This triggers a debate on whether or not full ownership is actually 
transferred to the ṣukūk holders. If full ownership is not transferred, 
the relationship between the ṣukūk holders and originator-obligor 
may be construed as merely that of lender-borrower and this can lead 
to a serious Sharīʿah issue.
It is acknowledged that such restrictions on the right to asset 
disposal do render the enjoyment of ṣukūk holders of their ownership 
over the asset incomplete. Nonetheless, this does not mean that 
ownership is denied altogether. There is still ownership by virtue of 
the sale and purchase contract between the ṣukūk holders (purchaser) 
and the originator (seller) of the asset. However, the ownership is 
incomplete (milk nāqiṣ) not by virtue of strict provisions of the law 
but by way of contractual terms that had been mutually agreed to 
between the ṣukūk holders and their obligor. In short, it is argued 
that although beneficial ownership originally is as good as complete 
ownership (milk tāmm), in asset-based ṣukūk the beneficial ownership 
is incomplete ownership (milk nāqiṣ) or restricted ownership for 
financial structuring reasons, which include the contractual restriction 
on ṣukūk holders (being the beneficial owner) from disposing of the 
asset during the ṣukūk tenure and upon the occurrence of an event of 
default (Dusuki & Mokhtar, 2010: 11).  
 
b. Asset-Backed Ṣukūk
Asset-backed ṣukūk are the Sharīʿah-compliant alternative to 
conventional asset-backed securities (ABS) which comprise a legally 
recognised asset class with its own technical meaning and legal 
structure. In asset-backed ṣukūk,  similar to conventional ABS, there 
must be a “true sale” of an asset9  between an originator and a SPV 
9 This asset should be income generating with a stable stream of cash flow. The main 
difference between Sharīʿah-compliant asset-backed ṣukūk and conventional ABS 
is the nature of the asset backing the securities. The asset in conventional ABS 
are essentially interest-based debts whilst the asset in asset-based ṣukūk must be 
Sharīʿah-compliant assets, either tangible or a combination of tangible, intangible 
and financial assets.
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where the legal ownership will be transferred from the originator to 
the SPV. It should be noted that the term “true sale” in ABS has 
a specific technical meaning. A “true sale” in an ABS structure 
indicates a “securitisation transaction” that entails a legal isolation 
of the asset from the originator to the SPV in order to achieve 
bankruptcy remoteness and full asset-backing and step-in rights with 
potentially “no-recourse” by the ABS holders to the originator. After 
the “true sale” or “securitisation transaction”, the SPV then issues 
the ABS. The investors who subscribe to the ABS gets undivided 
proportionate ownership of the underlying cash flows of the assets 
backing the ABS, although the legal title of the asset is retained by the 
SPV.  In this situation, the SPV acts as a trustee in holding the legal 
title of the asset for the ABS holders, who are the beneficial owners.  
In terms of ownership, we can see that the asset-backed ṣukūk 
holders only have beneficial ownership of the underlying asset. The 
legal title is held by the SPV, which is acting as agent and trustee 
for the ṣukūk holders. Does this mean that the ṣukūk holders do not 
have ownership over the asset? As we have seen earlier, beneficial 
ownership is generally treated in law to be as good as real ownership. 
In asset-backed ṣukūk,  we conclude that the ṣukūk holders enjoy 
complete ownership (milk tāmm) over the asset backing the ṣukūk 
subscribed from the SPV, although technically, they only have 
beneficial ownership and legal title is retained by the SPV. This is 
because there is no restriction on the ṣukūk holders’ enjoyment of 
their ownership rights.  Although the ṣukūk holders are supposed 
to act through the SPV and a trustee, the ṣukūk holders can make 
their own decisions as outlined in the trust in terms of disposal and 
management of the underlying asset. Moreover, the SPV has to act 
based on the instructions of the trust. 
This conclusion is further supported by the fact that asset-backed 
ṣukūk enjoy the feature of bankruptcy remoteness. This means that 
the asset backing the ṣukūk is legally isolated from the originator such 
that, even in the case of bankruptcy or receivership of the originator, 
the ṣukūk holders’ payment will not be interrupted as long as the asset 
continues to generate returns. On the other hand, if the underlying 
asset is not performing, the ṣukūk holders’ income will be impacted 
because they are the owners of the asset, unless the originator does 
not provide additional support (Dusuki & Mokhtar, 2010: 11). Thus, 
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in asset-backed ṣukūk,  the ṣukūk holders have full ownership rights 
over the assets, regardless of any default of the originator, and the 
actual performance of the underlying asset determines the return to 
the ṣukūk holders as well as any support the originator provides. 
c. Right to Recourse to the Underlying Ṣukūk Asset
“Recourse” means a legal right to claim. Its antonym, the phrase 
“without recourse” means one party has no legal claim against 
another.
We have seen in the preceding discussion that the recourse 
available to the ṣukūk holders in asset-based ṣukūk can be very 
different from the recourse available in asset-backed ṣukūk,  although 
the basic contract underlying both types of ṣukūk may be similar, i.e. 
the sale of assets by the originator to the SPV. In asset-based ṣukūk, 
the originator transfers partial beneficial ownership only to the SPV.
In asset-backed ṣukūk,  the originator transfers both legal title as 
well as full beneficial ownership of the asset to the SPV, such that 
the asset is legally isolated from the originator. Predominant legal 
ownership in the asset-based ṣukūk is retained by the originator whilst 
full legal ownership in the asset-backed ṣukūk is held by the SPV; 
both purportedly hold the asset in trust for the beneficial owners, i.e., 
the ṣukūk holders. However, in asset-based ṣukūk,  the ṣukūk holders 
typically do not have direct recourse to the asset but have recourse to 
the originator-obligor, principally due to the existence of the purchase 
undertaking and other guarantees or pledges in the ṣukūk structure. In 
asset-backed ṣukūk,  the ṣukūk holders also have recourse to the asset 
backing the ṣukūk mainly due to the absence of purchase undertaking 
and sale provisions in the trust deed. The difference in the recourse 
available to these two types of ṣukūk can be clearly seen, especially 
upon occurrence of default by the obligor. This, for example, has 
been clearly illustrated in the two Tamweel Ṣukūk issuances: (i) an 
asset-backed ṣukūk (the USD210 million ṣukūk in 2007 that was not 
affected by the insolvency and financial problems of the originator, 
Tamweel PJSC, because the ṣukūk holders had recourse to the 
underlying ṣukūk asset); and (ii) an asset-based ṣukūk (the USD300 
million convertible ṣukūk in 2008 that was directly affected by the 
insolvency and financial problems of the originator-obligor, Tamweel 
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PJSC, because the ṣukūk holders ultimately had recourse to Tamweel 
not the underlying ṣukūk asset due to the existence of the purchase 
undertaking) (Yean, n.d: 4-5; Howladar, 2009: 32).  
Based on the elaboration above, it can be concluded that the ability 
to have recourse to the ṣukūk asset is not necessarily influenced by the 
issue of ṣukūk holders’ ownership of legal title of the ṣukūk asset. 
Rather, the determining factor is whether or not there is any restriction 
on the ṣukūk holders’ enjoyment of their beneficial ownership right 
in the ṣukūk asset. In asset-backed ṣukūk,  there is no or very minimal 
restriction, so they can have full recourse to the ṣukūk asset. In asset-
based ṣukūk,  there are substantial restrictions in terms of the ṣukūk 
holders’ right to disposal and management of the ṣukūk asset due to 
the existence of a purchase undertaking and/or other restrictions. 
Instead, they have to exercise the purchase undertaking given by the 
obligor at the time of the ṣukūk issuance, i.e., they will have to sell the 




The lengthy discourse in this paper points to a number of conclusions:
 First: From the legal perspective, the dichotomy between 
beneficial ownership and ownership of the legal title is clearly 
recognised by English law and those following the common law legal 
tradition (e.g. Malaysia). In this legal tradition, beneficial ownership 
is generally treated as good as real ownership.
 Second: From the Sharīʿah perspective, the dichotomy between 
beneficial ownership and ownership of the legal title can be traced 
to at least two situations: in the discussion regarding incomplete or 
partial ownership (milk nāqiṣ) and in waqf arrangements. However, 
the acceptability of the use of beneficial ownership in contemporary 
Islamic finance practices is subject to differences of views among 
scholars, some of whom allow it while others do not.  
Third: This paper finds that the use of beneficial ownership 
in ṣukūk structures is acceptable in principle because the valid sale 
transaction that occurs between the originator and SPV effectively 
transfers ownership to the latter, although it is described as beneficial 
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ownership. Moreover, by ʾurf (customary practice) or law, beneficial 
ownership is considered effectively real ownership; thus, in principle, 
we view that it can be categorised as complete ownership (milk tāmm). 
However, beneficial ownership may be structured to be tantamount to 
incomplete ownership (milk nāqiṣ) when substantial restrictions are 
imposed on the ṣukūk holders’ enjoyment of their ownership right, 
such as restriction of the right to disposal and management of the 
ṣukūk asset due to a purchase undertaking and the like. 
Fourth: In asset-based ṣukūk, restrictions are normally placed 
on the ṣukūk holders in terms of right of disposal of the asset due to 
the existence of a purchase undertaking and selling restrictions in the 
trust deed, although they enjoy other ownership rights. Thus, we view 
that their ownership in this arrangement is tantamount to incomplete 
ownership (milk nāqiṣ).
Fifth: The ṣukūk holders in asset-backed ṣukūk have beneficial 
ownership that allows them to enjoy all ownership rights, including 
the right to asset disposal without any substantial restriction, even 
though they may not be the registered legal title owners. Thus, we 
view that in this arrangement, the ṣukūk holders enjoy complete 
ownership (milk tāmm) of the ṣukūk asset.
Sixth: The ability to have recourse to the ṣukūk asset is not 
necessarily influenced by the ṣukūk holders’ ownership of the 
registered legal title of the ṣukūk asset, as the ṣukūk holders in both 
asset-based and asset-backed ṣukūk have only beneficial ownership. 
The determining factor is whether or not there is any restriction on 
the ṣukūk holders’ enjoyment of their beneficial ownership right in the 
ṣukūk asset. In asset-backed ṣukūk, there is ability to have recourse 
to the ṣukūk asset because there is no or very minimal restriction in 
place. In asset-based ṣukūk, there is very limited recourse to the ṣukūk 
asset due to substantial restrictions on ṣukūk holders’ right to disposal 
and management of the ṣukūk asset. 
Finally, we conclude that ownership does transfer in the sale contracts 
validly made in ṣukūk transactions, be they asset-based or asset-
backed.
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